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HISPANOS AND THE CIVIL WAR IN NEW MEXICO:
A RECONSIDERA TION
DARLIS A. MILLER

IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CIVIL WAR, it was clear to leaders of
the Confederate States of America that New Mexico would have to
be seized by force to insure economic outlets on the West Coast.
This territory was viewed by the rebels as the key to Pacific expansion. Most western historians recognize the important role that
New Mexico played in preventing the Confederacy from establishing a sea-to-sea empire, but scholars traditionally have slighted
native New Mexicans, except perhaps to attribute the major Union
defeat at Valverde to their alleged cowardliness. I
To offset past omissions, this paper will stress Hispanic contributions to New Mexico's war effort as well as the impact that
the Civil War had on the lives of Hispanos. Furthermore, to understand more clearly the quality of interaction among ethnic groups
in the Southwest, this paper-to a modest extent-will focus upon
Hispanic-Anglo relations during the war years. 2
In 1861 New Mexico had a population, exclusive of Indians, of
approximately 80,000, the great bulk of whom were natives of
Hispanic descent. 3 It was a highly stratified society in which a
small wealthy Hispanic class (rieos) shared social, economic, and
political power with the wealthier and more talented members
within the Anglo community. Most New Mexicans were illiterate
and poor (pobres), subsisting in small rural villages or working on
large ranches. Many were held in debt peonage which meant virtuallabor for life to a wealthy land owner. 4
Because of Indian hostilities, New Mexico was garrisoned by a
relatively large number of United States troops-2,466-who
were widely scattered among nine major military posts. 5 After the
surrender of Fort Sumter, Union officials ordered regular soldiers
0028-6206/79/0400-0105$01.90/0
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to proceed east to the battlefront, leaving territorial defense to
volunteer soldiers and militiamen.
This movement east was later delayed, but it soon became apparent that to prevent the Southern Confederacy from overrunning the Southwest the Union army needed the support and goodwill of the Hispanic population, a people who had been citizens of
the United States for less than fifteen years. During the war the
Hispanos provided both manpower and supplies to the Northern
war effort, but initially Union officials voiced conflicting opinions
concerning their loyalty and military efficiency.
In April and May 1861, Governor Abraham Rencher assured
Secretary of State William Seward that everything was quiet and
tranquil in the territory; the people were attached to the Union
and secession had caused little excitement. Moreover, Rencher
stated, New Mexicans were more concerned about being protected
from Indians than being involved in events in the eastern United
States. 6 Henry Connelly, who succeeded Rencher as governor,
continually emphasized his belief that native New Mexicans
would remain loyal. 7 On the other hand, Colonel Edward R. S.
Canby, who assumed command of the Military Department of
New Mexico in June 1861, viewed Hispanos as apathetic and expressed little faith in their military competency. According to
Canby, New Mexicans could not furnish a reliable force to resist
invasion by Confederate troops but they could be used as Indian
fighters or as auxiliary soldiers to support the regular army. Canby's opinion of native New Mexicans declined even further as the
Confederacy mounted its invasion of New Mexico. Prior to the
battle at Valverde, for example, Canby reported that the "Mexican" people had "no affection for the institutions of the United
States" and, indeed, exhibited hatred for Americans. 8
Although Hispanic residents throughout the territory publicly
declared their loyalty to the United States,9 such declarations
.failed to allay fears among some Anglo residents that Hispanos
planned to stage an uprising and overthrow the Anglo power
structure. An officer stationed in Albuquerque reported, for example, that the "Mexican" population planned on June 7, 1861 to
rise and cut the throats of all "white men" in the territory.
Allegedly, this movement was to start simultaneously at Taos in
the north and EI Paso in the south. 10
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Nothing of this sort occurred. But residents of Mesilla in southern New Mexico declared for the Confederacy and in July 1861
welcomed the occupation of that town by Lieutenant Colonel John
R. Baylor and his Texas Mounted Rifles. It should be emphasized,
however, that support in this region for Baylor and the Confederacy came largely from the Anglo community, although a
small number of Hispanos joined Baylor's army and two were appointed officers in his newly created Confederate Territory of
Arizona. I I
Prior to the invasion of New Mexico by the Texas rebels, Colonel
Canby initiated plans to raise two regiments of volunteers among
the territory's citizenry, but recruitment progressed so slowly that
Canby told his superiors that the people of New Mexico had
greater concern for private and petty interests than in defending
the territory. 12 To stimulate enlistments, the Colonel sent influential Hispanos to recruit in rural villages and allowed families of
virtually destitute enlistees to purchase rations from the commissary.13 Special concessions had to be made for Hispanic
families because, as one recruiter stated, "[the men] will not enlist
readily unless they know that their families are cared for,"14
Although some individuals, such as Ceran St. Vrain, attributed
the difficulty in recruiting to Texas agents, probably the greatest
single handicap in the early months was lack of funds to pay recruits. IS An Albuquerque recruiter stated that no one in his town
would enlist unless the government showed good faith by paying
those who had already completed three-month enlistments. In
November 1861 Canby complained that lack of funds had almost
put an end to raising volunteers. 16
Yet despite initial hesitancy, approximately 2,800 residentsmost of them Hispanos-had enlisted in the New Mexico volunteers by February 1862. 17 Undoubtedly these men joined the army
for mixed reasons, but for many the chief attraction was the prospect of soldier's pay and bounties. During most of the war privates
were paid thirteen dollars a month, and men enlisting for three
years were given a bounty of one hundred dollars, one quarter of
which was paid in advance. The local press as well as recruiting
agents continually stressed the fact that laborers received better
pay in the volunteers than they could by working for wages. IS The
pay scale, in fact, appeared so attractive to civilian teamsters that
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they threatened to leave employment with the quartermaster's
department to join the volunteers. 19
Furthermore, military service was one way to escape peonage.
Soon after taking command, Canby issued a circular stating that
enlisted men could not be discharged because of past indebtedness
and that petitions to reclaim peons had to be filed with United
States District courts. The Santa Fe New Mexican subsequently
reported that large numbers of peons had "extricated themselves
from their thraldom as servants by going into the United States
Volunteer regiments."2o But the question of peonage plagued
military officers throughout the war years. The institution was
protected by territorial law, and Canby's orders were on occasion
ignored by county judges who arrested soldiers for debt under the
peonage act. 21 Although the flow of peons into the volunteers continued, the military apparently grew tired of legal harassment and
one of Canby's officers issued a cryptic command in September
1863 that "no peon will be enlisted without the consent of his
master." By the close of the Civil War, disgruntled citizens alternately charged that military officers aided masters in, and prevented them from, reclaiming peons. 22
Patriotism undoubtedly motivated many Hispanos to fight for
the Union cause. Early New Mexican historians, such as Ralph
Emerson Twitchell and L. Bradford Prince, believed that the large
numbers of Hispanos volunteering for service testified to their
patriotic sentiment. Personal testimonies of New Mexico volunteers are few, but among those who recorded their reasons for
enlisting was Captain Rafael Chacon, who, in typical patriotic
rhetoric, stated that he took up arms "filled with the most sincere
patriotism . . . in defense of the just cause of Union and
Freedom."23
For the masses, however, hatred for Texans cemented loyalties
to the federal government. The Texan "invasion" of New Mexico
territory in 1841 bequeathed a legacy of bitterness and hatred.
Thereafter Tejano became a detested word, and mothers in New
Mexico disciplined children with the threat "if you are not good,
I'll give you to the Tejanos, who are coming back."24 Governor
Connelly and Hispanic politicians capitalized on this hatred to encourage support for the war effort. In his proclamation ordering
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the organization of the militia, Connelly warned the people that
the territory had again been invaded by Texans and that their
"manhood" called upon them to defend their homes, their families, and the soil of their birth. In later years, native New Mexicans referred to this most bitter of all American wars as "the War
with the Texans. "25
The majority of Hispanos who joined the volunteers had no previous formal military training, although undoubtedly a large
number had defended communities against Indian attacks or accompanied volunteer units on Indian campaigns. 26 Officers came
from the rico class; enlisted men occupied a more humble status.
Upon enlisting, they most frequently listed their occupation as
"laborer," but others classified themselves as herders, farmers,
shoemakers, teamsters, carpenters, silversmiths, tailors, and even
musicians. Most Hispanos listed their birthplace as New Mexico,
but a surprisingly large number were born in the nearby Mexican
states of Chihuahua and Sonora. Generally the volunteers ranged
in age from eighteen to forty-five; the majority were in their early
twenties, although Eugenio Benevides of La Jolla enlisted at age
twelve and was honorably discharged at the ripe old age of fifteen.
His height of four feet seven inches apparently was overlooked
because frequently "able-bodied men of Mexican birth" were rejected by recruiters because they were under the regulation five
feet three inches. 27
As soldiers, native New Mexicans experienced a multitude of
frustrations after joining the volunteers. First, English was the
language of the military and although care was taken to appoint
Spanish-speaking officers to Hispanic units, confusion was inevitable in a force that was not totally bilingual. 28 Second, ethnic
jealousies surfaced; Hispanic officers resented the chauvinism of
their Anglo counterparts.' One Anglo captain recommended two
Hispanos for promotion by stating that "they are without any exception the two best and cleanest Mexican soldiers I ever seen."29
Canby and other high-ranking officers, however, made sure that
large numbers of Hispanos received appointments as officers and
promotions i~ military rank, but their solicitude resulted primarily from a desire to increase enlistments among the Hispanic
population. 3o
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Potential frustrations centered on the care and disposition of
enlisted men's families. Although some received rations at cost,
others had difficulty securing government subsistence. In addition, families of militiamen from the small village of Alamosabelow Fort Craig and in the line of the Texas advance-were
relocated north of the fort and forced to subsist on the generosity
of neighboring villagers. And in at least one case, the laundresswife of a Hispanic soldier was ordered off her husband's post since
the couple lacked proof of marriage. 31
One major source of dissatisfaction crippling morale prior to
the battle of Valverde concerned plans to transform cavalry units
into foot soldiers. Cavalry enlistees provided their own horses, and
although the government promised forage and forty cents per day
for the "use and risk" of their animals, a number of Hispanic officers protested that the government had failed to provide forage.
They feared that the army would purchase the horses at below
cost when their units were transformed into infantry, and they
warned that desertions would be numerous if this policy were
carried out. 32
Canby's inability to pay the volunteers on a regular basis caused
the most damaging blow to military discipline and morale. In
January 1862 news that the paymaster had been detained at Fort
Leavenworth and would not arrive in the territory until spring
caused two companies of Hispanic volunteers to revolt near
Socorro and one militia company to refuse guard duty at Fort
Union. Although the revolts were speedily suppressed, at least
thirty of the Socorro mutineers deserted and fled to the mountains. 33
Additional frustrations undoubtedly resulted from poor training
and inferior equipment furnished the volunteers. Upon enlistment,
companies of the first regiment assembled for instruction at Fort
Union, but instead of drilling, the men were employed day and
night on fortifications or were detailed to repair roads between
that post and nearby towns. 34 Although Canby reported in
December 1861 that the volunteers were improving in discipline
and instruction, he admitted that they were imperfectly equipped
and armed with inferior weapons. To save the expense of ammunition, the chief ordnance officer recommended that "Mexican"
volunteers be armed with lances. 35
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Want of money, munitions, and supplies of all kinds crippled
Canby's efforts to organize the volunteers, but conditions in the
territory became even more critical with the arrival of General
Henry Hopkins Sibley in mid-December 1861 at the head of three
regiments of Texas-Confederate soldiers. Rebel movement into the
interior of New Mexico toward Fort Craig, one hundred miles
south of Albuquerque, rekindled efforts by Canby and civil
authorities to recruit volunteers, organize the militia, and collect
supplies from the surrounding countryside. Captains of local
militia units contracted sizeable debts to outfit and care for their
men. Captain Juan de Jesus Martines expended nearly six hundred
dollars, for example, on food, lodging, fuel, equipment, and
transportation for his company, while a second captain paid out
over one hundred dollars for camp equipage (tin cups, plates, mess
pans, etc.), $182 for subsistence, plus additional amounts for fuel
and forage. 36
To insure adequate supplies, citizens were ordered to place their
riding animals, arms, and ammunition at the disposal of militia
officers who also were authorized to purchase or take by force
provisions to subsist their men. People living near Belen, however,
disliked the confiscation procedures of the militia. They complained that militia officers went into many poor peoples' homes
and took their last "mouthful of flour" while wealthy residents
were bypassed. The regular Union army also issued orders to seize
supplies if local New Mexicans refused to sell. In this way, the
army could establish its own price scale as the following instructions issued at. Fort Craig illustrate: "If the people of Paraja have
corn for sale, they must supply your camp, and if they refuse to do
so or ask more than three dollars a fanega, you are directed to take
the corn, giving receipts for the amounts."37
Thereafter, scores of New Mexico residents furnished food and
other supplies to the militia companies converging on Fort Craig
in the early months of 1862. Typical of claims later submitted
against the government was one sent in by Jesus Maria Pacheco of
Taos County who stated that in January and February of 1862 he
provided a militia company with one hundred twenty pounds of
buffalo meat, two sacks of flour, ten pounds of sugar, ten pounds
of coffee, two fanegas of corn, some candles, and one rifle,
amounting to one hundred fifty-two dollars in value. 38

112

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 54:2 1979

As the Confederates advanced up the Rio Grande, Canby's
greatest trouble continued to be lack of funds to finance military
operations. New Mexico residents were suspicious of governmentissued certificates of indebtedness and demanded gold and silver
for military purchases. 39 Canby made one unsuccessful attempt to
borrow money for the government in the fall 1861; a later attempt
partially succeeded but only after Canby and his officers promised
high interest rates for all loans. The details surrounding these
loans are unclear, but it is evident that Canby requested citizens to
furnish monthly installments of specie for use by the Union government. In November, Ferdinand Maxwell, Ceran St. Vrain, and
other residents of Taos reported their inability to comply with this
request. Apparently, the only citizens who turned money over to
the quartermaster at this time were Romaldo Baca and Miguel
Romero, each of whom furnished three hundred dollars, and Francisco Lopez and Trinidad Romero, who each furnished one hundred dollars. 40 But in the critical days following defeat at
Valverde, Assistant Quartermaster John C. McFerran succeeded
in borrowing from the richer Hispanos nineteen thousand dollars
in specie, a sum greatly needed by Canby to purchase supplies for
men in the field. 41
As Sibley's men approached Fort Craig in mid-February, Canby
believed that the fort could be held. He urged Governor Connelly
to leave Santa Fe and join him to aid in rallying the people. Connelly anticipated raising one thousand citizen-soldiers-"the
yeomanry of the country" -en route to Fort Craig, although apparently neither Canby nor Connelly expected to use these hastily
enrolled militia in actual combat. 42 Nonetheless, Union officers
employed brutal techniques in this critical hour-if a Confederate
diarist can be relied upon-to rouse the populace to arms. One
native New Mexican recounted to invading Texans his trials with
federal troops who bayoneted him and forced him to join the
march to Fort Craig. "He told us that there was many a man sick
that they had forced into the service but that no one was allowed
to stop or rest but men forced along by the federals." Manuel Armijo, one of the wealthiest Hispanic merchants in New Mexico
who subsequently aided the Confederate cause, also had been
pressed into the militia and was "compulsorily present in the action at Valverde."43

MILLER: HISPANOS AND THE CIVIL WAR

113

Confederate and Union soldiers engaged in the first major battle
in New Mexico at Valverde ford, six miles above Fort Craig, on
February 21, 1862. Sibley's force consisted of about 2,500 men,
while Canby reportedly had 3,810 men under arms. After a day's
fierce battle, the Confederates claimed victory as Union forces
retreated behind the walls of Fort Craig. Canby later attributed
his defeat to "the refusal of one of the volunteer regiments to cross
the river" and assist Captain Alexander McRae's battery which
bore the brunt of a Confederate charge and which was finally
overrun. Volunteers who formed part of McRae's support had
become panic-stricken and in their confused retreat communicated their panic to the regular troops causing some to flee
the battlefield. On February 22, Canby reported that large
numbers of the militia and volunteers had deserted. 44
Canby's critical assessment of the New Mexico volunteers and
militia was supported by members of his staff and others in high
command. One week after the battle of Valverde, for example,
Captain Gurden Chapin, Acting Inspector General, wrote Major
General H. W. Halleck that "the militia have all run away and the
New Mexican volunteers are deserting in large numbers. No
dependence what ever can be placed on the natives; they are worse
than worthless; they are aids to the enemy, who catch them, take
their arms, and tell them to go home." Moreover, Major J. L.
Donaldson, commanding the District of Santa Fe, stated that "No
reliance can be placed on the New Mexican Volunteers or Militia,
and I advise their being disbanded. They have a traditionary fear
of the Texans, and will not face them in the field. "45
Canby's explanation of the Valverde defeat has received more
attention than differing interpretations. Frequently overlooked is
Governor Connelly's report that McRae's battery was overrun
because regular troops failed to charge the enemy as ordered.
When the regulars refused to advance, the volunteers followed
their example and "both retired from the field."46 Nor do secondary sources cite the allegation of Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts
that the misfortunes of the day could have been averted had Major
Thomas Duncan and his regular troopers occupied and held as
ordered a wooded area at the Valverde crossing. 47
The most damaging evidence against the military performance
of the New Mexico volunteers and militia, however, was the large
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number of desertions recorded for these units. Many deserted after
the debacle of Valverde and others did so in subsequent months.
Because a portion of the deserters had fled to the hills where they
survived by brigandage, Canby issued General Orders No. 43 on
May 7, 1862 discharging from the service all deserters from the
New Mexico volunteers and militia and, in addition, offering a
pardon to those who returned home and reported themselves to
the alcaldes of their precincts. 48 By September 8, 852 men had
taken advantage of this amnesty program and were officially pardoned by the military high command. 49
Desertion rates among Union troops elsewhere in the United
States were also appallingly great. A major cause underlying this
problem, according to one authority, "was an utter absence of a
realization of the obligation incurred by enlistment and failure to
impress that obligation on the mind of the soldier by firm discipline," a condition which certainly prevailed in New Mexico. 50
Also contributing to the high number of recorded desertions was
the general confusion which prevailed after the defeat at Valverde.
Because the number of men retreating to Fort Craig "was more
than could be usefully employed," Colonel Canby ordered the
militia to withdraw from the fort, detour around the enemy, and
concentrate at Polvadera-there to form guerrilla parties to harass
the enemy on their march up the river. 51 This movement caused
the militia to melt into the countryside, as many men simply
returned to their homes. On March 11, Governor Connelly reported to Secretary Seward that "the militia have all dispersed,
and have gone to preparing their lands for the coming harvest,"
while the Santa Fe Gazette stated that after the battle Canby simply dismissed most of the militia and they returned to their
homes. 52 Indeed, local tradition notes that after the defeat at
Valverde, "all the volunteers were left to shift for themselves. . .
living on birds and rabbits they killed, and on what they could beg
from farm houses" as they made their way home. 53 It is likely that
many militiamen as well as New Mexico volunteers acted in obedience to orders issued by officers to return to their homes and were
not therefore deserters, as was determined to be true in the case of
Captain S. Barrientes's company. 54
Failing to capture Fort Craig, Sibley's army continued its advance up the Rio Grande and in March met defeat near Santa Fe
at Glorieta Pass. Union troops engaged in this battle consisted
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mainly of Colorado volunteers, although a few New Mexico soldiers also saw action. But the long-neglected hero of this affair was
Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chavez, an old Indian fighter from a
respected New Mexico family, who led Major John M. Chivington
and a detachment of Colorado soldiers over the mountains to
intercept the enemy. By destroying the Confederate supply
wagons, Chivington's men seriously crippled Sibley's Army of
New Mexico. 55
Stripped of provisions, Sibley retreated to Albuquerque and
eventually decided to evacuate New Mexico. Problems of supply
had continually plagued his command. His men lived off the land
on their drive north and they continued this practice as they
retreated south. Sheep, cattle, hogs, com, beans, chickensnothing was safe from Confederate foragers, not even strings of
red peppers and kegs of molasses. Toribio Romero of Los Lunas
alone suffered losses which he totalled to be over four thousand
dollars when Texans confiscated wheat, com, and other edibles in
addition to tobacco, wine, brandy, and twelve barrels of
whiskey. 56
As Confederate soldiers reentered the Mesilla Valley, many area
residents drove their cattle across the border into Mexico for
safety, but Sibley's confiscations were so extensive on the
American side of the Rio Grande that it was feared there would be
a famine among the people. Enraged by this marauding, Hispanic
residents took up arms, killing members of Confederate foraging
parties and driving off their livestock. 57
The retreating Confederates left behind war-inflamed passions
and the knowledge that some territorial residents-a few Hispanos
and even more Anglos-had aided and supported the hated invaders. On July 14, 1862, a military tribunal meeting in Santa Fe
sentenced Jose Maria Rivas to be shot to death for having served
as a spy for the Confederate forces. 58 Several Hispanos were jailed
by military authorities on similar charges, while others were indicted for treason in United States district courts. 59 Among the latter was Bias Lucero who went into exile in El Paso, Mexico after
the Confederates were driven from the Rio Grande. No less a
figure than General James H. Carleton, Canby's successor, inter. vened on Lucero's behalf, and the case against Lucero subsequently was dropped. 60 Indeed, most indictments for treason
against territorial citizens were either quashed or nolled, although
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a handful of Anglos and Hispanos stood trial for their alleged support for the Confederacy.61
As the tired and dispirited Texas troops left the territory, New
Mexico's fighting strength was augmented by the arrival of 2,300
California volunteers, commanded by General James H. Carleton.
For the remainder of the war, volunteer soldiers from New Mexico
and California spent most of their time fighting Indians and
guarding against a Confederate reinvasion. The impact of the
military establishment on civilians during these years, however,
was intense, frequently unpleasant, and of long duration, since
New Mexico remained under martial law until guns were silenced
on the east coast.
In the southern portion of the territory, army officers played a
major role directing civil affairs. Carleton's men, for example,
issued liquor licenses, ordered residents to repair homes and clean
streets, appointed some precinct officers, and allowed military
commissions to assume duties of civil courtS. 62 Male citizens living
in Hispanic villages near Fort Craig were forced to labor without
pay to strengthen its fortifications. 63
The order most detested by Hispanic residents in southern New
Mexico, however, was issued by Carleton as a result of a threatened Confederate reinvasion. To prevent the enemy from subsisting off the land, Mesilla Valley residents were ordered to sell all
surplus corn at three dollars per fanega-a sum considerably
below contract prices. And Carleton stipulated that all grain
could be taken by force if necessary. Shortly after this order was
implemented, many Hispanic residents abandoned their lands and
migrated into Mexico, apparently taking their surplus grain across
the border. 64
Complaints registered by Hispanic residents against the military
were many, but perhaps they were no louder nor more frequent
than those lodged by Anglo residents. By the close of the war, New
Mexico was divided into two camps; those supporting Carleton,
his military regime, and his Indian program, and those opposed.
Wealthy Hispanos were found in each faction. 65
The most important influence of the Civil War on the lives of
many Hispanos was that it brought economic prosperity and fulltime employment. The army was the largest employer in the territory. Fort Union during the war years registered four hundred
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twenty-five civilian employees while an estimated nine hundred
were employed in the entire Department of New Mexico. 66 A sizeable number of these positions were occupied by Hispanos, who
typically were hired as teamsters, laborers, herders, laundresses,
spies, and guides.
During the crisis of the Texas invasion, Hispanos and Anglos
alike furnished the army with large quantities of corn, wheat,
forage, and other commodities, and because the government purchased at least some of these supplies in open market, even small
Hispanic farmers benefited from federal spending. Hay, for example, was purchased by the burro load in Santa Fe as well as in
larger quantities. 67 Later, military contracts were subject to competitive bidding, but when speculators drove up the price of
staples, the army on occasion reverted to its practice of purchasing in open market, which again benefited the small producer. 68 In
addition, some Hispanos reaped enormous profits by furnishing
transportation and foodstuffs to Navajo Indians held captive by
the army at Bosque Redondo. 69
Certainly then the Civil War had far-reaching influences upon
New Mexico and its people. It brought subtle developments which
went unrecognized during the turmoil of armed conflict and military occupation. Carleton's Indian policies, for example, reinforced New Mexico's traditional political factionalism, and his
energetic Indian campaigns opened new agricultural lands for settlement and development. California soldiers who arrived at the
beginning of the war remained to settle in the territory, invest in
its economy, marry Hispanic women, and thereby hasten Americanization. 70 During this great conflict, economic ties of ricos
with the Union government were strengthened, and fighting on
the winning side undoubtedly bolstered commitment to the American flag. But to the dismay of the ricos, the destruction of
American slavery brought in its wake the legal end to peonage.
And more importantly, the war with the Tejanos served to advertise the West, as soldiers and newspaper correspondents described
to eastern readers possibilities for economic exploitation. The
war's end brought a steady stream of Americanos looking for new
opportunities which forced Hispanos to fight for continued economic and political power. As they pledged to uphold the American constitution and the laws of their adopted country, Hispanos
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experienced during the Civil War years the beginnings of forces
which gradually eroded the foundations of their traditional
society.
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